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Identifying Misleading Advertising 
J. EDWARD RUSSO 
BARBARA L. METCALF 
DEBRA STEPHENS* 
A procedure for identifying misleading advertising is presented, based solely on 
measured consumer beliefs. An advertisement is misleading if an exposed group 
holds more false beliefs than a comparison group. When ten allegedly misleading 
advertisements were tested, two were identified as incrementally misleading, and 
four others were shown to be exploitively misleading. 
Determining whether an ad is misleading continues to 
prove difficult and controversial. Naturally, advertis- 
ers and consumer advocates rarely agree on whether a par- 
ticular ad is misleading. More disappointing, however, is 
the failure of researchers to agree on a broadly applicable 
definition of misleadingness or a procedure for identifying 
it (Gardner 1975; Jacoby and Small 1975; Preston 1976). 
The problem is further complicated by the conflict between 
the behavioral paradigm of researchers and the jurispruden- 
tial view of regulatory organizations. 
In this paper, we propose and test a procedure for iden- 
tifying misleading advertising. Contrary to custom, the pro- 
cedural problem is confronted first, and a definition of mis- 
leadingness follows. The procedure is empirically based, 
as it relies on the measurement of consumer beliefs. 
Presumptions 
We make certain presumptions when we speak of mis- 
leading advertising. First and most important is the dis- 
crepancy between the claims of an ad and the facts of actual 
product performance.' If such a discrepancy does not exist, 
no one can be misled. The second presumption is that con- 
sumers cannot by themselves correct all claim-fact discrep- 
ancies. Individual consumers cannot correct some claims 
because verification is technically impossible or prohibi- 
tively expensive. For example, how can the ordinary con- 
sumer determine whether Volvos are built better than 
Fords? Manufacturers themselves are generally unable or 
unwilling to provide consumers with substantiation for such 
claims (Corey and Patti 1979). The final presumption is 
that not all claim-fact discrepancies can be corrected by 
natural market mechanisms (Eighmey 1978). In some cases 
the market is self-correcting, as when a false claim is cor- 
rected by a competitor's advertising. And, of course, eco- 
nomic self-interest dictates the correction of any false 
impressions of one's own products that reduce sales. In 
spite of some self-correction, however, there are many in- 
stances where natural market mechanisms are inadequate. 
Clearly, claim-fact discrepancies do exist at market equi- 
librium, and misleading advertising does increase sales. 
These presumptions impose two requirements on any so- 
lution to the problem of misleading advertising. There must 
be some extramarket, institutionalized system for detecting 
misleading advertising. Such a regulatory system may be 
public, private, or mixed (as we currently have in the 
United States). Second, whatever combination of public or 
private institutions regulates advertising, there should be 
some equitable, standard procedure to determine whether 
an ad is misleading. The focus of this paper is on such a 
procedure. 
THREE APPROACHES TO UNJUST 
ADVERTISING 
One may best understand our procedure in the context 
of three alternative views of unjust advertising: fraud, fal- 
sity, and misleadingness.2 These views parallel the three *J. Edward Russo is Associate Professor and Barbara L. Metcalf is a 
former Research Project Manager, both at the Graduate School of Busi- 
ness, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637. Debra Stephens is a 
doctoral candidate in the Department of Behavioral Sciences, University 
of Chicago. This article has benefited from the comments of Julie A. 
Edell, Hillel J. Einhom, Michael B. Mazis, Andrew A. Mitchell, John 
Paul Russo, and especially from those of Ivan L. Preston. The senior 
author acknowledges Jacob Jacoby for introducing him to the problem, 
and Jeffery Godlis and Michael Hyman for collaboration on an early pilot 
study. This research was supported in part by Grant DAR 76-81806 from 
the National Science Foundation. 
'A major assertion of this paper is that the focus of misleading adver- 
tising should shift from "an advertisement's claims" to "consumer be- 
liefs." This change is discussed shortly. Until then, we continue to use 
the traditional term, claims. 
2There is some confusion among the jurisprudential, scientific, and or- 
dinary meanings of the terminology of misleading advertising. We use 
unjust advertising as a superordinate label, and fraudulent,false, and mis- 
leading as distinct subordinates. Not used are the two terms Congress 
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components of an advertising communication: the adver- 
tiser, the message itself, and the resultant consumer beliefs 
about the advertised product. 
Fraud 
Fraud focuses on the advertiser and assumes a deliberate 
intent to create false beliefs about the product. We believe 
that fraud is neither a valid nor practical approach. It is 
invalid because the advertiser's intent may be irrelevant to 
the harm done to consumers. It is impractical because the 
requirement of proof of intent makes it difficult to take 
action against the ad, and thereby stop the harm it is doing 
to consumers. 
For both reasons, fraud plays a declining role in current 
regulatory practice. The Federal Trade Commission has not 
been required to prove intent for over 30 years.3 Similarly, 
the main industry regulator, the National Advertising Di- 
vision (NAD) of the Better Business Bureau, does not need 
to prove fraud in order to find that an ad should be with- 
drawn (Ashmen, Hasenjaeger, Hunt, Katz, Miracle, Pres- 
ton, and Schultz 1979, p. 57). Unfortunately, current stat- 
utes still require proof of fraud in some situations, such as 
the U.S. Postal Service's regulation of advertising through 
the mails. 
Falsity 
Falsity in advertising refers to the existence of a claim- 
fact discrepancy. Examples include price and availability 
claims, as when a vendor advertises a product at a reduced 
price. "Literal truthfulness" requires both that the item be 
sold at the advertised price and also that a reasonable num- 
ber of such items be available for sale. 
In order to demonstrate falsity in advertising, one must 
verify the existence of a discrepancy. For prices, this is a 
simple task, accomplished with numerical certainty. For 
availability, however, it becomes more complicated. What 
is the minimum number of advertised items a vendor must 
have available for purchase? To answer such questions, 
numerical certainty must give way to subjective judgment. 
The most common approach is the use of expert testimony; 
but, of course, experts do not always agree. Especially if 
the issue is important, experts can usually be found to sup- 
port each opposing viewpoint. 
Standardization of Meaning. The usefulness of the fals- 
ity approach is greatly enhanced if a regulatory institution 
has the power to standardize the meaning of critical words. 
How else can one resolve the falsity of a claim like "nu- 
tritious"? There is some nutritional value in even the worst 
junk food, and experts do not agree on what constitutes a 
"nutritious" food. Standardization of meaning removes the 
ambiguity and potential misleadingness of such terms. 
Standardization has become a widely used regulatory 
strategy. Many trade associations regulate the use of prod- 
uct descriptions, and governmental agencies standardize 
product labels. For example, the Department of Agriculture 
sets standards for grades of fruits, and even determines 
whether a product name, like peanut butter, can be used at 
all. As "unconscionable lies" have disappeared from ad- 
vertising, the role of standardization of meaning has be- 
come increasingly important in demonstrating the falsity of 
an advertised claim.4 
Insufficiency of Falsity. In spite of the efficacy of a 
demonstration of falsity, it is neither sufficient nor neces- 
sary to prove that an ad is misleading. What matters is what 
consumers believe. A false claim does not harm consumers 
unless it is believed, and a true claim can cause great harm 
if it generates a false belief. 
Some false claims are clearly harmless. Fanciful cartoon 
characters, though literally false, can enhance the belief of 
a valid claim. Similarly, true claims can create false, harm- 
ful beliefs. Consider the following (hypothetical) audio 
commercial: "Aren't you tired of the sniffles and runny 
noses all winter? Tired of always feeling less than your 
best? Get through a whole winter without colds. Take Er- 
adicold pills as directed" (Harris 1977; Harris and Monaco 
1978). The ad's claim that Eradicold pills will prevent win- 
ter colds is not linguistically asserted, yet it is clearly im- 
plied. Preston (1975, p. 7) describes a television ad for toy 
racing cars that the FTC found to be deceptive. Through 
clever close-up photography, the impression was created 
that the cars were traveling faster than they actually could. 
In short, we believe that falsity is the wrong criterion. 
What is claimed and what is believed can be quite different, 
and it is what is believed that harms consumers. 
Misleadingness 
The third view, misleadingness, focuses exclusively on 
consumer beliefs. A demonstration of misleadingness re- 
quires the observation of false consumer beliefs in con- 
junction with exposure to the ad. Whereas falsity refers to 
a claim-fact discrepancy, misleadingness refers to a belief- 
fact discrepancy. During the last two decades, the FTC 
altered its approach to unjust advertising, so that the focus 
gradually shifted from the message itself to the resulting 
beliefs of consumers. In keeping with this change in focus, 
the percentage of FTC advertising cases using behavioral 
evidence has increased from four percent prior to 1954 to 
wrote into the FTC's mandate declaring "unfair or deceptive" advertising 
to be unlawful. Unfair has a special legal meaning (Cohen 1974), and 
deception's ordinary meaning, which connotes the intent to mislead, dif- 
fers too widely from its legal meaning, misleadingness, whether intended 
or not. The terms misrepresentation and misperceptionlmiscomprehension 
are avoided because they suggest the locus of blame, the advertiser and 
the consumer, respectively. 
3For brief histories of the FTC's regulation of advertising, see Jentz 
(1968), Chapter 9 of Preston (1975), or the broader review of Aaker 
(1974). 
41n spite of its general acceptance, some believe that this approach is 
bound to fail. They argue that advertisers are too clever and will always 
circumvent simple prohibitions on terminology. 
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54 percent in the early 1970s (Brandt and Preston 1977). 
A thorough legal analysis of the various definitions of unjust 
advertising, including the need to rely on consumers' be- 
liefs or "expectations," is presented by Beales, Craswell, 
and Salop (1981). 
RATIONALE OF THE PROCEDURE 
The proposed procedure for identifying misleading ad- 
vertising requires the assessment of consumer beliefs about 
a false claim. This means that consumer beliefs must be 
measured and then classified as correct or incorrect. The 
incorrect beliefs must be further partitioned into those that 
can harm consumers to the benefit of advertisers, and those 
that cannot harm consumers. Thus, the category of incorrect 
beliefs is divided into misleadingly false and correctably 
false. This coding scheme is most easily explained with an 
example. 
Misleadingly False Versus Correctably False 
Beliefs 
Consider a banana ad that claims "there's only 85 cal- 
ories [in a banana]." This claim is false because an average 
banana contains 101 calories. There are two types of in- 
correct beliefs: an average banana contains fewer than 100 
calories (100 is considered correct as a rounded encoding 
of 101), or it contains more than 101 calories. Although 
both inaccuracies are potentially harmful to the consumer, 
only the former serves the advertiser's goal of selling more 
of the product (except for those very few consumers seeking 
more calories). Any belief that calories exceed 101 can be 
presumed to be correctable by natural market mechanisms. 
That is, the advertiser has the incentive of increased sales 
to correct the impression that there are more than 101 cal- 
ories in a banana. We call such beliefs correctably false. 
However, if consumers believe that calories number below 
100, the advertiser benefits at the expense of the consumer. 
These misleadingly false beliefs are the ones that require 
extramarketplace regulation. Therefore, the proposed pro- 
cedure for detecting misleading advertising focuses only on 
these beliefs. As the proposed procedure is best introduced 




Ten magazine ads were selected for testing. All had a 
verifiable claim-fact discrepancy, and were independently 
correctable. The latter phrase means that the ad can be 
altered to remove all of the misleadingness and none of the 
legitimate persuasiveness. The original and corrected ver- 
sions, combined with a no-ad (control) treatment formed 
the three treatment conditions of the experiment. 
One hundred consumers were recruited from city and 
suburban social organizations. They were instructed to read 
and evaluate the entire advertising message. They then an- 
swered questions designed to assess belief in the misleading 
claim and in an important legitimate claim. Responses to 
these questions form the evidence on which misleadingness 
is to be identified. 
Two potentially confounding effects were evaluated and 
found to be absent. Beliefs were unaffected by the ads' 
construction, which was below professional quality. Dif- 
ferent interest levels in purchasing a product did not affect 
the likelihood of a misleading belief. 
Consumer Subjects 
One hundred members of PTA, church and women's 
organizations were recruited as experimental subjects. All 
organizations were from Chicago area suburbs or city 
neighborhoods with middle rankings (median 110 out of 
200) on the recent reports of socioeconomic status of Chi- 
cago area communities. Citing her husband's job in adver- 
tising, one person declined to participate, leaving a sample 
of 99. Subjects earned a flat rate of $4.00 for their partic- 
ipation, as well as a 10-cent bonus for correctly answering 
each of ten selected questions. Payment was credited to the 
subjects' organizations; no payments were made directly to 
individuals. 
Based on self-reported sociodemographic data, the av- 
erage participant was female, age 39, with slightly more 
than two years of college completed, and an annual house- 
hold income of $25,000. (The 1978 estimated average Chi- 
cago household income after taxes was $21,679.) Con- 
sumers who are above average in income and education 
were probably overrepresented in our sample. Thus, the 
reported results may not generalize across the entire United 
States population. However, as subjects were partitioned 
into four groups as demographically balanced as possible, 
within the time schedule and location constraints of field 
testing, any atypicality was evenly balanced across treat- 
ment groups. 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were 
asked whether they had trouble reading any of the 12 ads. 
As the ads contained large amounts of text, it is not sur- 
prising that 51 percent reported some trouble with at least 
one. The 17 subjects who reported some difficulty with four 
or more ads were dropped from the study. This left a total 
of 82 subjects distributed in groups of 19, 17, 26, and 20. 
We tested for differences in subject characteristics across 
these four groups, and found none. An analysis of variance 
revealed no significant (p < 0.05) differences for any of 
the measured sociodemographic characteristics: income, 
education, age, occupation, and number of younger (under 
six years) and older (six to 17 years) children living at 
home. 
Task 
Participating consumers were shown a series of ads. 
Their task was to read and comprehend the entire advertis- 
ing message, and to evaluate the product. To assure that 
the entire message was perceived and understood, subjects 
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were asked a simple factual question immediately after 
seeing each ad, and were paid a ten-cent bonus for each 
correct answer. To simulate realistic viewing, subjects were 
also asked if the ad made it more or less likely that they 
would purchase the product or, if the product was one for 
which they had no use, recommend purchase to a friend. 
After all ads had been shown, a second group of questions 
was presented. One question was designed to assess mis- 
leadingness and the other to measure the effectiveness of 
some legitimate claim. In general, the subject's task was 
to process each ad completely in preparation for factual, 
evaluative, and substantive questions. 
Advertisements Tested 
Ten ads were chosen to satisfy several criteria. First, 
there had to be a verifiable claim-fact discrepancy. Because 
we had no special testing facilities to verify product claims, 
we had to rely on publicly available criteria or our own 
judgment. The public criteria were decisions of the NAD 
and a proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule on the use of 
nutritional claims in food advertising (Federal Trade Com- 
mission 1974). 
The second selection criterion was correctability. An ad 
is correctable if the misleading claim can be removed with- 
out reducing its legitimate power to persuade. For example, 
the banana ad that falsely claims 85 calories for what people 
presume to be a banana of medium size can be corrected 
by substituting the true caloric value, 101 calories, for the 
false one. This does not change the central legitimate claim 
that a banana and a glass of milk is a superior "60-second 
breakfast. " 
The introduction of corrected versions of each tested ad 
restricted us to print sources. We did not have the facilities 
to duplicate and modify broadcast ads. Thus, the ten ads 
selected for testing were taken from popular magazines, 
including 1975-1978 issues of Better Homes and Gardens, 
Good Housekeeping, Newsweek, and Redbook. 
The ads were also chosen to represent a wide variety of 
products. They included the following product categories: 
acne treatments (Mudd), automobiles (Chevrolet Nova), 
bananas (Dole), breakfast cereals (Cheerios and Kellogg's), 
breakfast drinks (Tang), cigarettes (Carlton), margarine 
(Diet Imperial and Fleischmann's), and snack foods (Gran- 
ola Bars). Summaries of five of these ten ads are presented 
in Exhibit 1. 
Preparation and Display. We prepared corrected ver- 
sions of the ads by removing the misleading part of the 
message and substituting a revised portion. Some revisions 
were typed, so the appearance of the ad clearly showed that 
it had been altered. So that this "cut-and-paste" appearance 
did not differentially affect the corrected versions, cosmetic 
alterations were also made on the original versions. Thus, 
both sets of ads appeared equally altered. 
To test whether this cosmetic alteration affected con- 
sumers' comprehension of an ad's message, four untouched 
original versions were shown. These untouched originals 
were exact copies of the ads that appeared in the magazine. 
Note that there was no difference in content (pictures and 
text) between the untouched and altered versions. The latter 
merely substituted identical typewritten segments for what 
had been typeset in the untouched originals.5 For both ver- 
sions of each ad, we computed the proportion of consumers 
holding misleadingly incorrect beliefs. These proportions 
showed no significant differences (p < 0.05), either in ag- 
gregate or for the four ads tested individually. 
After all ads had been prepared, they were photographed 
and printed as 2-inch x 2-inch slides. Subjects viewed 
these slides at a convenient viewing distance. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design contained three homogeneous 
and one mixed-treatment condition. Each of these condi- 
tions contained one version of all ten experimental ads. 
The first treatment condition contained the ten (cosmet- 
ically altered) original ads. The second contained the cor- 
rected ads. The third group contained no ads, which is to 
say that the same questions were asked of subjects, but 
without exposure to any version of the ad. A fourth treat- 
ment was mixed. It included the four untouched originals 
and variations of the six other ads.6 
The four subject groups should not be confused with the 
four treatment groups. To counterbalance any subject dif- 
ferences, each subject group saw two or three ads from 
each treatment condition in an approximation of a Latin 
square design. That is, each subject group saw seven or 
eight of the ten ads once, but not in the same treatment 
condition. For example, a subject in the first group saw the 
original Tang ad, the corrected Chevy Nova ad, no version 
(the control treatment) of the Fleischmann's ad, and the 
unaltered Carlton ad. The results depend only on the dif- 
ferences across treatment conditions, not subject groups. It 
should be remembered that within the same treatment con- 
dition different ads were seen by different subjects. This 
will explain the differences in sample sizes within the same 
treatment condition. 
Procedure 
Consumer subjects participated in small groups (range of 
group size, four to 11) in a subject's home. After two prac- 
tice ads and samples of the questions, subjects saw seven 
or eight of the ten experimental ads. (Recall that two or 
three ads occurred in the no-ad treatment.) In addition, two 
or three distractor ads were shown. The (cosmetically mod- 
ified) distractors were included to reduce any suspicion that 
the ads were selected to be misleading. The exposure time 
'The four ads for which both untouched and cosmetically altered orig- 
inal versions were prepared are Carlton cigarettes, Diet Imperial margar- 
ine, Fleischmann's margarine, and Tang breakfast drink. 
6These variations are not relevant to the results reported here. They are 
described in Russo et al. (1979). 
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EXHIBIT 1
MISLEADINGLY FALSE, LEGITIMATE, AND CORRECTED CLAIMS FOR SELECTED ADVERTISEMENTS 
Advertised product and type of 
claim Content of claim 
Dole bananas 
Misleadingly false "and there's [sic] only about 85 calories (in a banana)." This number is true only 
for small bananas. A typical medium-sized banana contains 101 calories. 
Legitimate The central theme of the ad is that a banana and a glass of milk are relatively 
healthful as a very fast breakfast. The headline reads "the 60-second breakfast 
from Dole." 
Corrected The corrected ad substituted 101 for 85 in the calorie claim. 
Chevy Nova automobile 
Misleadingly false The bottom of the ad prominently displays a picture of a Chevrolet Nova with a 
price. The car is shown with white striped tires, wheel covers, and body side 
molding. The price shown, $3,823, is not the price of the car shown. The actual 
price is $3,948, a value that can be obtained only by adding three additional 
prices (white striped tires $44; wheel covers $39; body side molding $42). These 
latter values are given in the text of the ad. 
Legitimate The ad's theme is that a Chevy Nova is inexpensive, yet rugged enough to be a 
police car. 
Corrected The boldly printed price at the bottom of the ad is changed from $3,823 to $3,948. 
Thus, the price shown becomes that of the car shown. 
Nature Valley Granola bars 
Misleadingly false "Nature Valley Granola bars [are] crunchy, wholesome, delicious." According to a 
proposed Trade Regulation Rule of the FTC the word "wholesome" may connote 
"nutritious" and cannot be used unless the product satisfies a minimum standard 
of nutrition (defined in terms of the percent U.S. RDA of the eight nutrients listed 
on the food label). Granola bars fall far short of the minimum standard. 
Legitimate The theme of the ad is that Granola bars are a "100 percent natural" snack. They 
contain "no additives [and] no preservatives." The headline is "Go Natural." 
Corrected The word "wholesome" was removed, eliminating the nutrition claim. This was 
judged to be an advertiser's likely response. The only alternative permitted by 
the FTC's proposed rule is the inclusion of a very unflattering table of percent of 
U.S. RDA. 
Carlton cigarettes 
Misleadingly false The ad includes a list of alternative "low tar" brands and their mg. of tar per 
cigarette. This list is shown in the left panel of Exhibit 2. The alternative brands 
listed are not those lowest in tar. The misleading implied claim is that no other 
"low tar" brands are nearly as low as Carlton; specifically, that even if one 
smokes the second lowest brand, one must inhale five times the tar of Carlton. 
Legitimate The ad truthfully claims that Carlton has less than all other brands. This claim is 
stated in the headline, "Carlton is lowest." 
Corrected The misleading panel is changed to contain the six brands lowest in mg. of tar, in 
order and without omissions, as shown on the right of Exhibit 2. 
Diet Imperial margarine 
Misleadingly false The ad states no restriction on the use of Diet Imperial, implying that it can be 
substituted for regular margarine in any situation. This implied claim is true when 
margarine is used as a spread, a use pictured in the ad; but it is not true when 
margarine is used in cooking. As Diet Imperial achieves its caloric reduction by 
diluting regular margarine with water, there is 50 percent less oil per tablespoon. 
Legitimate The central claim is that Diet Imperial has 50 instead of 100 calories per 
tablespoon. The headline reads, "Try delicious, new Diet Imperial. Still only half 
the calories of butter or margarine." 
Corrected A disclaimer is added, "Do not use in baking." 
Note: A complete description of all ten ads can be found in Russo, Metcalf, and Stephens (1979). 
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for each ad ranged from 30 to 90 seconds, as determined 
by laboratory and field pretests. After viewing each ad, the 
subjects answered the factual question and rated the like- 
lihood of purchase. After all ten ads had been seen, they 
completed a questionnaire that included the questions about 
misleading and legitimate beliefs, a seven-point rating scale 
of interest in the product category, reading difficulty, and 
various sociodemographic characteristics.7 
PROCEDURES FOR DETECTION OF 
MISLEADINGNESS 
The experiment just described provides the following 
evidence on which to base a judgment that an ad is mis- 
leading: false beliefs held by consumers who did and did 
not see an ad, and also by consumers who saw a corrected 
version of the same ad. Based on this evidence, how can 
a misleading ad be identified? 
Criterion 1: Consumer Belief of a False Claim 
Is it sufficient to demonstrate that a claim is false and 
that people believe the claim? This is a claim-fact discrep- 
ancy coupled with direct evidence that people believe the 
claim. Many researchers would answer yes to this question, 
with one qualification.8 They would require that the per- 
centage of misled consumers exceed some minimum (n per- 
cent) needed to declare an ad misleading (Gellhorn 1969; 
Jacoby and Small 1975). As has been argued elsewhere, 
the problem of finding the best value, or even several val- 
ues, of n percent is insoluble (Russo 1976). For each ad the 
observed percentage of misled consumers must be judged 
against its own standard, not against some universally ap- 
plicable cutoff. 
As an example of the belief in a false claim, consider the 
ad for a Granola Bar (Exhibit 1). This product is claimed 
to be "wholesome" in the sense of nutritious. Consumers 
who saw the original ad were asked their belief about the 
nutrition in a Granola Bar. The average percent U.S. RDA 
(Recommended Daily Allowance) for the eight "leader" 
nutrients was believed to be 32 percent. The true value is 
two percent. Eighty-two percent of consumers believed the 
average U.S. RDA exceeded five percent. These data in- 
dicate extensive belief of a false claim; 82 percent must 
surely exceed anyone's n percent cutoff. Nonetheless, the 
question remains whether this evidence of a false belief is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the Granola Bar ad is mis- 
leading. Phrased differently, does this evidence show that 
the false belief was caused by reading the ad? 
Our answer is no. Consumer belief of a false claim is 
necessary to demonstrate misleadingness, but it is not suf- 
ficient. The problem is simple: this evidence does not ex- 
clude the possibility that consumers would hold the same 
false belief even if they had not seen the ad. 
The design of our experiment permits a test of this al- 
ternative hypothesis. In the control treatment consumer sub- 
jects answered the same question about nutritional content 
without having viewed the ad. The control group's mean 
was 28 percent of the U.S. RDA, a value not reliably dif- 
ferent from 32 percent. The proportion of people providing 
misleadingly false answers also showed no significant dif- 
ference, 87 percent for no-ad versus 82 percent for the 
original ad. Thus, though a claim-fact discrepancy exists 
and a large percentage of consumers believe the claim, the 
evidence does not show that the ad is responsible. 
The trouble with identifying misleadingness solely from 
false beliefs is that it uses an absolute criterion, n percent 
of consumers holding a misleadingly false belief. No matter 
how high this cutoff, the level of false belief could exceed 
it (and trigger the condemnation of the ad as misleading), 
even though the false beliefs were derived entirely from 
preexisting misconceptions. 
Criterion 2: Increased Belief in a False Claim 
After Exposure to an Advertisement 
A second approach rectifies the main flaw of the first one 
by requiring a causal demonstration of misleadingness. An 
ad is identified as misleading whenever exposure to that ad 
increases the false belief held by consumers. That is, the 
proportion of consumers holding a misleadingly false belief 
is greater for the group that views the ad than for the control 
group that does not view the ad. We call this incremental 
misleadingness. It is probably the clearest, least controver- 
sial form of misleadingness. The rationale for identifying 
incremental misleadingness is based on a standard before- 
after comparison in which the before group provides the 
criterion against which the level of false belief is compared. 
A comparison similar to this has been proposed by Arm- 
strong, Gurol, and Russ (1978), although Jacoby, Hoyer, 
and Sheluga (1980) found this approach to be impractical. 
To see how this procedure works, consider the Dole ba- 
nana ad described in Exhibit 1. It claims 85 calories per 
banana, while the truth is 101. A misleadingly incorrect 
answer is anything less than 100 calories. (Recall that both 
100 and 101 calories are considered correct because con- 
sumers are likely to encode 101 as "a hundred.") The 
7We tested for a possible relation between each consumer's level of 
product interest and the likelihood of a misleading belief. In order to 
maximize any effect of interest level, only extreme responses were in- 
cluded. The low-interest group qualified by a response of 1 or 2 on the 
seven-point scale; inclusion in the high-interest group required a 6 or 7. 
A total of 233 low-interest and 184 high-interest responses were available. 
The proportions misled were essentially identical, 0.67 for low-interest 
and 0.68 for high-interest subjects. 
To test each advertisement individually, we increased the smaller sam- 
ple size. Those responding 3 were added to the low-interest group; those 
responding 5 were added to the high-interest group. No difference was 
significant (p < 0.05), except for the Cheerios advertisement. We could 
find no reason for this exception, and concluded that it was probably a 
false alarm. (Whenever ten tests at ot = 0.05 are performed, at least one 
such false alarm will occur 40 percent of the time.) 
8Some researchers would not qualify an affirmative answer at all. Gard- 
ner and Barbour (1980) measured price errors after exposure to four tire 
advertisements. Because the mean error is large, 26 percent, and "a siz- 
able portion of the sample" held the erroneous belief, they conclude that 
the advertisements are misleading. 
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TABLE 1 
PROPORTION OF MISLEADINGLY INCORRECT ANSWERS 
AFTER VIEWING ORIGINAL AD 
Advertisement seen 
Product Original None (Control) 
Carlton .92 (25)a .94 (18) 
Cheerios .68 (19) .60 (20) 
Chevy Nova .65b(20) .00 (17) 
Diet Imperial 1.00 (20) .85 (26) 
Dole .92b(26) .44 (36) 
Fleischmann's .94 (17) .88 (26) 
Granola Bar .82 (17) .87 (15) 
Kellogg's .88 (17) .60 (20) 
Mudd .82 (17) .61 (46) 
Tang .40 (20) .39 (18) 
Mean .80 .62 
aNumbers in parentheses are sample sizes. 
bp < 0.05. 
proportion of misleadingly incorrect beliefs is 0.92 for the 
original group and 0.44 for the control group. This differ- 
ence is both large and statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
We conclude that viewing the ad caused an increase in the 
level of false belief, and we find it incrementally mislead- 
ing. 
The causal assertion of misleadingness can be strength- 
ened by examining those answers that are "exactly mis- 
leading," in this case the 85 calories stated in the ad. If 
the ad is changing consumers' beliefs about caloric content, 
then more consumers in the original treatment than in the 
no-ad (control) treatment should answer exactly 85 calories. 
The proportions are 0.50 (13 of 26) for the original group 
and 0.03 (1 of 36) for the control group, again a significant 
difference. 
This criterion for misleadingness was applied to all ten 
ads. That is, we tested for a higher level of misleadingly 
false beliefs in the original treatment than in the no-ad (con- 
trol) treatment. Table 1 reports the two proportions and the 
results of a chi-square test for their equality.9 Significant 
misleadingness was found in only two cases, the Dole ba- 
nana and Chevy Nova ads. 
What about the other eight supposedly misleading ads? 
Are they really not misleading at all, or only not incre- 
mentally misleading? There is at least one other form of 
misleadingness that Criterion 2 overlooks, exploitive mis- 
leadingness. The criterion of increased false belief after 
exposure to an ad is sufficient evidence of misleadingness, 
but it is not necessary. Specifically, it fails to detect non- 
incremental forms of misleadingness. 
Exploitive Misleadingness 
All advertisers feel that changing people's beliefs is a 
very difficult task. It takes many exposures, usually to dif- 
ferent ads, for a campaign to change beliefs. It is much 
easier to link a product to existing beliefs. Granola Bars are 
believed to be nutritious because Granola cereal has that 
image. Trying to raise the existing belief about nutritional 
content would be costly and unnecessary. Better to free- 
ride on this existing belief, reinforcing and utilizing it to 
sell the product. We call this exploitive misleadingness. 
The advertiser does not mislead by increasing false beliefs, 
but by exploiting those that already exist. 
If this type of misleading advertising exists, how can it 
be detected? Obviously, the previous procedure will fail. 
By the very nature of exploitive misleadingness there is no 
increase in the level of false belief. At least two approaches 
are possible. The first is to show an increase in something 
other than the misleadingly false belief. The confidence in 
the belief and the importance of the belief to an overall 
product evaluation are secondary beliefs that may be in- 
creased by exposure to the ad. For example, Armstrong, 
Gurol, and Russ (1978) found that a Listerine mouthwash 
ad increased only the importance of a false belief. This 
approach retains from Criterion 2 the concept of an increase 
as a causal demonstration of the effect of the ad. However, 
it changes the focal observation from primary to secondary 
beliefs. The development of this approach is an important 
goal of future research. 
Alternatively, one can continue to focus directly on the 
misleadingly false belief and search for a more sensitive 
comparison than the no-ad (control) treatment. The second 
approach, a more sensitive comparison, forms the basis of 
Criterion 3. 
Criterion 3: Less Misleadingly False Beliefs for 
Corrected Than for Original Advertisements 
We believe that a properly corrected ad provides the de- 
sired comparison. For each of the ten original ads a cor- 
rected version was designed to remove the original claim- 
fact discrepancy, and to affect no other aspects of the ads. 
For example, in the Granola Bar ad the word "wholesome" 
was eliminated. In the Carlton ad, the table of mg. of tar 
for selected brands was replaced by one containing the low- 
est brands, as shown in Exhibit 2. 
If a significantly lower level of misleadingly false belief 
is produced by the corrected ad, we conclude that the prod- 
uct attribute involved in the false claim is perceived by 
consumers and exploited by the advertiser. For example, 
92 percent of consumers exposed to the original Carlton ad 
believed- that the brand second lowest in tar contained more 
than 1 mg. By comparison, only 40 percent of consumers 
who saw the corrected version held this false belief. The 
corresponding mean estimate of mg. of tar dropped from 
4.5 to 1.9. 
Using a corrected version to provide the standard of com- 
parison comforms to a common scientific principle. A com- 
9Unfortunately, the chi-square test is two-tailed, whereas our hypothesis 
is one-tailed. However, all nonsignificant p values exceeded 0.10. In one 
case (the Kellogg advertisement), all sample size requirements for a chi- 
square test were not met, and a Fisher's Exact test was used (p = 0.07). 
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EXHIBIT 2 
PANELS OF TAR RATINGS FOR COMPETING BRANDS IN THE 
CARLTON CIGARETTE ADVERTISEMENT 
Originala Corrected 
Winston Lights 12 Tempo 7 
Vantage 11 Pall Mall 6 
Salem Lights 11 True 5 
Kent Golden Lights 8 Iceberg 3 
Merit 8 Lucky 3 
True 5 Now 1 
Carlton Soft Pack 1 Carlton Soft Pack 1 
Carlton Menthol less than 1 Cariton Menthol less than 1 
Carlton Box less than 1 Carlton Box less than 1 
aThese panels occupied about 10 percent of the area of each advertisement. 
parison condition should alter only the variable of interest 
and hold constant everything else. Because the corrected 
ad changes only the misleading component, it is better able 
than the no-ad condition to sense whether consumers are 
perceiving, and being exploited by, this misleading com- 
ponent.10 The use of a corrected ad as the standard of com- 
parison was proposed by Jacoby and Small (1975). 
This third criterion was applied to all ten ads. The re- 
duction in the proportion of misleadingly false beliefs be- 
tween the original and the corrected treatments is shown in 
Table 2, along with the results of a chi-square test for equal- 
ity of two proportions. Based on this test, six of the ten ads 
are found to be misleading: Carlton, Chevy Nova, Diet 
Imperial, Dole, Granola Bar, and Tang. 
What about the remaining four supposedly misleading 
ads? Does this mean that they are actually not misleading? 
Possibly, but there is at least one other explanation for the 
failure to find original-corrected differences in the propor- 
tion of false beliefs. Maybe the corrections were ineffec- 
tive, either because they were not persuasive, or because 
consumers ignored them. For the two ads with nutritional 
claims, Cheerios and Kellogg's, evidence indicated that the 
TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF MISLEADINGLY INCORRECT ANSWERS 
AFTER VIEWING CORRECTED AD 
Reduction compared 
Corrected to original 
Product advertisement advertisement 
Carlton .40 (19)' .52b 
Cheerios .69 (26) -.01 
Chevy Nova .16 (19) .49b 
Diet Imperial .24 (17) .76b 
Dole .20 (20) .72b 
Fleischmann's .95 (19) -.01 
Granola Bar .56 (16) .26b 
Kellogg's .92 (26) -.04 
Mudd .74 (19) .08 
Tang .12 (17) .28b 
Mean .50 .30 
aNumbers in parentheses are sample sizes. 
bp < 0.05. 
correction was ineffective. " In general, however, it is not 
possible to discriminate between a poor correction and the 
absence of exploitive misleadingness. 
What is a Proper Correction? 
Not every corrected ad can legitimately serve as a com- 
parison to the original. For example, in the extreme it is 
possible to correct an ad by gutting it, that is by destroying 
its ability to communicate any product claims, misleading 
or otherwise. Such an alteration is obviously improper. 
Two aspects of the correction are critical: independence, 
or whether reducing the misleading claim interferes with 
the persuasiveness of legitimate claims, and informative- 
ness, or how much the correction depends on providing 
correcting information. 
Independent Correction. The correction should reduce 
the misleading belief without affecting legitimate persua- 
siveness. This has not always been easy to achieve. At least 
two studies tested the FTC correction of Listerine ads and 
found attenuation of belief in claims other than the target 
of correction (Dyer and Kuehl 1978; Mazis and Adkinson 
1976). 12 
Recall that the ten ads were selected partly on the basis 
of a clear separation between the misleading claim and an 
important legitimate claim. If the corrections were inde- 
pendent, consumer belief in these legitimate claims should 
be just as high for the corrected ads as for the original ones. 
The critical proportions are shown in Table 3. 
The mean proportions show no difference between the 
'"Cohen (1977) and Wright (1977) have each proposed a similar pro- 
cedure for identifying misleadingness. Both proposals compare consumer 
beliefs after exposure to original and corrected ads. These proposals dif- 
fered from ours mainly in the rationale for designing the corrected ver- 
sions. The authors of these proposals work from an information provision 
strategy in which the corrected ad is limited to factual, truthful claims. In 
the context of the Food and Drug Administration's regulation of drug 
advertising, Wright's (1977) corrected ad is "an unadorned text that de- 
scribes non-blacklisted conditions the product can alleviate, in the direct 
terms the FDA sanctions" (p. 14). Similarly, Cohen (1977, p. 15) favors 
"a true 'bare bones' version, closer in substance and mode of presentation 
to what is on the label." Both proposals differ from our strategy of making 
the corrected and original ads as similar as possible in all respects, except 
the misleading claim. The approach of Cohen and Wright seems to be 
motivated by a belief that many misleading claims are manifest throughout 
an ad, including its pictorial and verbal content. Cohen (1977, p. 15) 
states that the "use of a 'bare bones' base-line would, in my opinion, 
quite properly make the advertiser responsible for the entire ad." We are 
more optimistic that misleadingness can be removed without turning the 
ad into a label. 
"The details of this analysis can be found in Russo et al. (1979). 
'2Note that we tested only one legitimate claim for each ad. To show 
that one claim is not infirmed is not to show that all were not. However, 
we did try to select a major thematic claim whenever possible, and it is 
fair to say that the present results could not be more supportive of the 
assertion that legitimate persuasiveness was preserved. 
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TABLE 3 
PROPORTION OF CORRECT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 
ASSESSING LEGITIMATE PERSUASIVENESS 
Version of the advertisement 
No 
Product Corrected Original advertisement 
Carlton .95 (20)' .92 (26) .28 (18) 
Cheerios .88 (26) .95 (19) .65 (20) 
Chevy Nova .79 (19) .90 (20) .35 (17) 
Diet Imperial .88 (17) .90 (20) .46 (26) 
Dole .90 (20) .92 (26) .89 (36) 
Fleischmann's .16 (19) .06 (17) .27 (26) 
Granola Bar .65 (20) .69 (16) .18 (17) 
Kellogg's .42 (26) .53 (17) .15 (20) 
Mudd 1.00 (19) 1.00 (17) .80 (46) 
Tang .65 (17) .45 (20) .39 (18) 
Mean .73 .73 .44 
aNumbers in parentheses are sample sizes. 
corrected and original treatment groups. Tests of individual 
ads also reveal no significant differences. To make clear 
that both versions were genuinely persuasive, the propor- 
tion of correct responses for the no-ad treatment is also 
shown in Table 3. The corrected and original treatments 
exhibit a much higher belief level than does the no-ad 
group: 0.73 versus 0.44 on the average. We conclude that 
the corrections were independent in that they did not reduce 
the considerable legitimate persuasiveness of the original 
ads. 
Informativeness. There are two corrective strategies: 
provide nonmisleading information, or cease mentioning 
the misleading attribute. Because the misleading table of 
alternative brands in the Carlton ad was replaced, as shown 
in Exhibit 2, the correction was informative. If the mis- 
leading table had been removed without being replaced, the 
correction would have been uninformative. The Granola 
Bar ad was uninformatively corrected by dropping the nu- 
tritional claim, "wholesome." In contrast, it could have 
been informatively corrected by adding a table of percent 
of U.S. RDA (Russo et al. 1979). 
An uninformative correction is not always possible. If 
the misleading belief is not explicitly activated by some 
component of the original ad, there is nothing to remove. 
The only way to correct such an ad is to add information. 
The Diet Imperial margarine advertisement provides such 
an example (Exhibit 1). To correct the false belief that Diet 
Imperial can be used in cooking (which it cannot because 
it is 50 percent water), an informative disclaimer had to be 
added. 
Both the informative and uninformative corrections pro- 
vide valuable evidence about the level of exploitive mis- 
leadingness. The uninformative does less correcting, and 
will almost certainly be the choice of advertisers. It also 
provides the more conservative test. We expect a smaller 
original-corrected difference in misleading belief when the 
correction is uninformative. Not saying anything ought not 
to reduce a false belief as much as telling people the truth. 
Forced Education. Advertisers may claim that by com- 
paring an ad to its corrected version they are being held to 
an unreasonable standard. They are being required to ed- 
ucate the public. Not only might such a requirement violate 
their freedom of speech, but it would be impossible for an 
ad to provide enough factual information to correct every 
existing false belief. 
This argument is groundless. A regulatory organization 
is often justified in requiring that the advertiser explicitly 
provide information in order to decrease some existing false 
belief (Beales et al. 1981). A warning on the use of a drug 
is a common example. The disclaimer that Diet Imperial 
margarine should not be used in cooking is another exam- 
ple. The question of whether to reduce misleadingness by 
requiring additional information in an ad really involves the 
severity of harm. This, in turn, is a question of utility and 
action selection. Although it is essential in any regulatory 
context, we would like to keep it separate as long as pos- 
sible from the more scientific question of the existence of 
misleadingness. We return to this topic later. 
Summary of Recommended Procedure 
The prerequisite to our recommended procedure for iden- 
tifying misleading advertising is empirical evidence of con- 
sumer belief. Specifically, we require the proportions of a 
representative group of potential purchasers that hold a 
misleadingly false belief after exposure to: the original ad, 
one or more corrected versions, and no ad at all. 
Given this evidence, the identification of incremental 
misleadingness is straightforward. If the level of misleading 
belief is (statistically significantly) higher for the original 
group than for the no-ad (control) group, then the ad is 
found to be incrementally misleading. Exposure to the ad 
increases the level of false belief. 
Exploitive misleadingness occurs when the ad does not 
increase, but free-rides on, an existing level of misleading 
belief. If the level of misleading belief is (statistically sig- 
nificantly) higher for the original ad than for the corrected 
version, the ad is found to be exploitively misleading. The 
selection of a corrected version is critical. The most con- 
servative correction is both independent and uninformative. 
This provides the most conservative test. 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
The n Percent Problem 
The inadequacy of Criterion 1 is essentially a statement 
about the insolubility of the n percent problem. The diffi- 
culty with establishing a single standard of n percent (or 
even a sliding standard) is that this task confounds two 
concepts, the existence of misleadingness and its impor- 
tance. Criterion 2, for identifying incremental misleading- 
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ness, succeeds precisely because it separates existence from 
importance. It accomplishes this in the same way that clas- 
sical statistical hypothesis testing separates statistical sig- 
nificance from practical importance. When statistical tech- 
niques show that there is significantly more misleading 
belief in the original group than in the no-ad (control) 
group, all we have demonstrated is that misleadingness ex- 
ists. There is no judgment about the importance of that 
misleadingness, in terms of the seriousness of the potential 
harm to consumers.'3 
The judgment of seriousness depends on the nature of 
the advertised claim. In our procedure it remains, as it must 
remain, the prerogative of the regulator. It is worth noting 
that as n percent increases, both the existence and serious- 
ness of misleadingness increase. This partly explains why 
these separate issues have been confused in the past. 
Remedial Action and Utility 
If an ad is misleading, what remedial action, if any, 
should be taken? The problem of action selection is, of 
course, one of judging the severity of harm to consumers. 
In principle, the existence and severity of misleadingness 
are separate issues. In practice this distinction cannot al- 
ways be achieved. 
Consider an (hypothetical) ad for Efficax, a new powerful 
nonprescription pain reliever. Efficax has only one quali- 
fication, it relieves all but one common pain, say, angina 
of effort. (This is the temporary pain caused by too little 
blood to a working muscle.) As consumers' past experi- 
ences are only with drugs that relieve all common pain, it 
is likely that an initial advertising campaign will find a 
linkage between the legitimate belief of the relief of most 
pain and the misleading belief of angina relief. The more 
effectively an ad persuades consumers of Efficax's power, 
the more it is apt to increase the level of false belief, even 
with a clear disclaimer that angina is excluded. Such an 
effective ad might, according to Criterion 2, be identified 
as incrementally misleading. However, the net benefit to 
society could still be positive, because the benefit of the 
legitimate belief might outweigh the damage of the mis- 
leadingly false belief. 
This example illustrates a situation that affects the appli- 
cability of Criterion 3 for detecting exploitive misleading- 
ness. The legitimate and misleading beliefs may be inter- 
dependent. The promoting of Efficax as powerful increases 
both the legitimate and misleading claims. These beliefs 
are similar and naturally linked. 
For the ten ads that we corrected and tested, legitimate 
persuasiveness was undiminished. In each case the legiti- 
mate and misleading beliefs were independent. In general, 
however, we cannot expect independence among beliefs. 
And once the legitimate and misleading claims are linked, 
correction comes only at the expense of legitimate persu- 
asiveness. Because some correction can always be attained 
(if necessary, by turning the ad into an informative label), 
the use of the corrected ad as a comparison loses its validity. 
Thus, we stop short of applying Criterion 3 to the case of 
a link between the misleading and legitimate beliefs. 
This is not to say that regulators cannot honestly find an 
ad misleading in the face of such a linkage. But to do so 
they must consider severity of damage, or disutility. For 
example, if a correction lowered the legitimate belief by 
one percent and the misleading belief by 40 percent, the 
regulating agency might well find the ad misleading or, 
more properly, unnecessarily misleading. Note that this 
judgment implicitly involves the relative utilities of a one 
percent decrease in the legitimate belief versus a 40 percent 
decrease in the misleading beliefs. Normally one would opt 
for the 40 percent and sacrifice the one percent, but not 
always. The decision must depend on the specific utilities 
(Beales et al. 1981). 
Although we restrict our procedure to the independent 
case, we suggest that one topic of future research is the 
formal extension of the procedure to action selection. Such 
an extension would incorporate utility judgments, possibly 
the marginal utilities of the various decreases in the legit- 
imate and misleading belief levels caused by different cor- 
rections. 
A Definition of Misleadingness 
The conventional strategy for measuring misleadingness 
starts with a definition of misleading advertising and de- 
velops a measurement procedure by operationalizing that 
definition (Jacoby and Small 1975; Olson and Dover 1978). 
We have reversed that process, first constructing a proce- 
dure and now defining misleadingness: 
An advertisement is misleading if it creates, increases, or 
exploits a false belief about expected product performance. 
The key words in this definition are "belief" and 
"false." We focus on what consumers believe as a result 
of reading an ad, regardless of what the ad claims or what 
the advertiser intended it to claim. We also require that 
resulting beliefs not be false, i.e., that the expectation of 
product benefits be justified. This definition is compatible 
with several other "behavioral" definitions of misleading- 
ness, especially those of Gardner (1976) and Olson and 
Dover (1978). 
'3A remaining problem is determining the appropriate sample size of 
the test of misleadingness. A close analysis will reveal that the issue of 
sample size reintroduces the judgment of seriousness of harm, but in a 
less damaging way. Ideally, the appropriate sample size is partially de- 
termined by the utilities of the two statistical errors (Hamburg 1970). The 
more harmful a given level of misleadingness, the more important is its 
detection and the larger should be the sample size. The appropriate sample 
size is a decision that should be jointly made by researchers and policy 
makers. Although it is an untidy remnant of the n percent problem, it 
should affect only a few marginal determinations of misleadingness. These 
cases will occur when relatively few people are misled, but the potential 
damage is great, such as a misleading drug ad to physicians. 
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Other Measures of Misleadingness: Percent 
Misled Versus Amount Misled 
The only evidence used by the proposed procedure is the 
percentage of misled consumers. A measure of the amount 
of misleadingness would provide more information from 
the same number of consumer subjects. For example, the 
size of the misleadingness in the Carlton ad could be mea- 
sured by how far above 1 mg. each consumer believed the 
second lowest brand to be. That is, instead of scoring re- 
sponses of 2 and 10 mg. as identically incorrect, the greater 
error reflected by the 10 mg. belief could be preserved by 
measuring the size of these two errors as 1 and 9 mg., 
respectively. 
Although numerical measures of misleadingness would 
increase the efficiency of the test procedure, they have their 
disadvantages. The proportion of misled consumers is more 
intuitively understandable than a corresponding numerical 
measure. Also, across ads the proportion remains compa- 
rable, whereas different numerical measures would be re- 
quired, such as mg. of tar for one, percent of U.S. RDA 
for another, and so forth. Nonetheless, the use of numerical 
measures should not be excluded, but rather explored. Their 
advantages may be essential in some situations. 
APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURE 
Puffery 
The proposed procedure applies to all advertising claims, 
including puffs. These are transparent exaggerations, often 
in the form of superlatives ("the finest beer you can buy") 
or hyperbole ("pain relief so effective you'll think you're 
20 again"). The law considers the falsity of such claims so 
transparent as to render them harmless. Consumers are as- 
sumed to see through the exaggeration, and to place no 
credence in puffed claims (Preston 1975; Rotfeld 1979). 
Essentially, the law embodies two extreme assumptions 
about the beliefs of consumers: fact-based claims are cred- 
ible to all, while puffs are credible to none.14 
The procedure proposed here makes no distinction be- 
tween puffs and other claims. More generally, the increas- 
ing use of behavioral evidence should reduce, and even- 
tually eliminate, the distinction between puffed and fact- 
based claims (Oliver 1979). 
This is not to say that the problem of puffery in adver- 
tising is now solved, because the elusiveness of puffed ad- 
vertising reappears in a different form. Recall that besides 
demonstrating belief in the claim, our procedure requires 
that the claim be verifiably false. To identify a puffed claim 
as misleading, one must be able to demonstrate that the 
corresponding belief is false. How do we decide whether 
Giordano's really makes "the best pizza in Chicago," or 
that some hair transplant "will restore your sense of man- 
hood"? Depending on the regulatory criteria for verifying 
such falsity, this demonstration can be more or less diffi- 
cult. Nonetheless, by abandoning the presumption that no 
one ever believes puffery, and substituting a test for mis- 
leadingness based on measured consumer beliefs, we can 
begin to deal with the real impact of puffed claims on con- 
sumers' beliefs and purchases. 
Limitations 
Verifiability. The proposed procedure requires that the 
allegedly misleading claim/belief be verifiably true or false. 
This becomes problematical when the beliefs are evaluative 
and subjective rather than factual. Is a cigarette ad's implicit 
claim that the smoker will appear more sophisticated ob- 
viously false? A simple yes or no answer is not possible. 
Although many people would agree that the primary out- 
come of cigarette smoking is the risk of lung cancer, many 
teenage girls see cigarettes as genuinely conferring a so- 
phisticated status.15 
A task of future research is the development of methods 
for verifying claims that are essentially evaluative/subjec- 
tive. One hopeful factor is that a misleading claim, such as 
enhanced sophistication, may engender many subclaims. 
Misleadingness can be demonstrated with any one of these. 
Thus, if misleadingness is genuinely present, the problem 
of verifiability may be overcome by finding any verifiable 
subclaim. 
Creating the Correction. For some ads a correction 
may be possible in theory only. Consider a TV ad for a 
health-related, but not medical, product such as a breakfast 
cereal without chemical additives. The advertiser might 
misleadingly imply a medical claim by dressing the spokes- 
person in a white lab coat or setting the testimonial in a 
hospital. Correction of such an ad is straightforward, ex- 
change the lab coat and hospital setting for typical nonmed- 
ical counterparts. But, what if the spokesperson is an actor 
who is closely identified with his role as a physician in a 
movie or TV series? It may not be possible to find a "cor- 
rected" actor, one with no false medical image, but with 
equal appeal and legitimate credibility. 
Devising a proper corrected ad requires cleverness and 
effort. Like its reflection, the control group in experimental 
science, the corrected ad may pose practical difficulties, 
but at least the goal is clear. 
"4Unfortunately, this dichotomy has been necessary. Regulatory judg- 
ment of fact-based claims, like those tested in our experiment, is difficult 
enough. The additional burden of puffed claims would have strained the 
existing jurisprudential system past endurance. 
"5A psychologically deep issue underlies this phenomenon. Expectations 
can influence reality, especially social reality. Your chance of appearing 
to others as sophisticated (or sexy or friendly) increases if you believe that 
you are sophisticated (or sexy or friendly). The communication by ads of 
such "social psychological representations" has been examined by Shimp 
(1979). 
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Naturalistic Measurement 
For a valid assessment of consumer belief, the ad must 
first be presented as naturalistically as possible. This might 
mean embedding a print ad in editorial material and a 
broadcast ad in regular programming (Collins and Jacobson 
1978). It might also require multiple exposures ("Multiple 
Exposure Test Needed to Evaluate Commercials" 1979) or 
testing on split-sample cable TV to obtain matched groups 
of viewers (Mizerski, Allison, and Calvert 1980). In gen- 
eral, the goal is to create a natural exposure context, often 
with so-called "low involvement" by the consumer (Mitch- 
ell 1979; Mitchell, Russo, and Gardner 1981). Advertisers 
have developed many techniques for naturalistic presenta- 
tion and, within cost constraints, we recommend their use. 
Even with naturalistic presentation, however, one must 
still measure beliefs nonreactively. A nonreactive measure- 
ment technique is one that does not change the behavior it 
is trying to measure (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Se- 
chrest 1966). Suppose that we want to know how advertis- 
ing affects the beliefs of potential purchasers of state lottery 
tickets about their chances of winning. They are exposed 
to a persuasive ad that emphasizes the wonderful ways of 
spending one million dollars. If we now ask, "What do 
you think your chances are of winning the million-dollar 
grand prize?" most would correctly respond that their 
chances are small. But this response probably reflects the 
effect of the question, not what it was supposed to measure, 
the effect of the message. Answering the question activates 
a rational consideration of the probability of winning that 
would not otherwise occur. Such questions would never be 
asked under normal conditions of exposure to an ad. If we 
were then to measure purchase intention, we would almost 
certainly find it lower than that of an exposed group not 
asked the misleading question. 
The problem of reactivity to the measurement procedure 
is worse for questions about misleadingness. Because such 
beliefs are false, deliberation about them is more apt to 
reverse them. Simple solutions to the problem of nonreac- 
tive measurement do not exist. Each case requires a differ- 
ent creative approach to posing a question subtly enough 
that people respond without reacting. 
Use By Advertisers 
If a standardized procedure for identifying misleading- 
ness were established, advertisers could pretest to avoid 
regulatory action. If they knew the evidence that the NAD 
or FTC would use to judge misleadingness, they could col- 
lect that evidence prior to public exposure of the ad. There 
would be no need to second guess regulators' judgments. 
Besides helping to avoid costly regulatory action, a pre- 
test may reveal that the misleading claim is not essential to 
selling the product. One of the striking findings of our ex- 
periment is that the main thrust of the ads was not attenuated 
by removal of the misleading claim. Consumers still be- 
lieved that Carlton is lowest in tar or that a Chevy Nova is 
good enough to be a police car. Our procedure enables 
advertisers to evaluate the contribution of any specific claim 
(not only a possibly misleading claim) to a major thematic 
belief about the product. 
Use By Regulators 
Standardized procedures reduce both the cost and the 
uncertainty of regulatory action. Beyond these advantages, 
the use of our procedure over time poses some interesting 
possibilities. The cumulative body of empirical evidence 
would constitute a partial census of misleading advertising. 
Types of claims that are particularly troublesome could be 
exposed. One could also map the various values of n per- 
cent of consumers who hold false beliefs. It would be in- 
teresting to know for which product category advertising 
is the most misleading, and for which the level of false 
belief is highest. 
This type of census can be used to help establish long- 
range priorities for the regulatory agency, such as those that 
exist in the field of consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
(Hunt 1977). A census of dissatisfaction across product 
categories reveals where dissatisfaction is highest and re- 
medial action most needed. 16 
[Received December 1980. Revised March 1981.] 
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